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China’s recent propaganda against Japan is not so much directed at the rest of the world as at 
the Chinese audience at home. The leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) needs to 
maintain the myth that the CCP defeated the Japanese Imperial Army to perpetuate the monop-
oly of power by the CCP. The absence in China of freedoms of thought, expression, assembly 
and association, all prerequisite for democracy, allows the CCP leadership to train and mold 
Chinese people to the thought pattern designed by it. 
The CCP leadership keeps denouncing Japan’s past acts that took place before the post-war 
international order was established by the United Nations. It is too preoccupied with the ghost 
of Japanese “militarism” to appreciate the fundamental change of Japanese society that has 
taken place since 1945. To correct its own story of the bogeyman of Japanese militarism would 
threaten the “legitimacy” and “authority” of the CCP leadership that it has so carefully crafted, 
and the “enemy state” clauses of the UN Charter is a great help.  
In the name of “the realization of the Chinese dream of the great national renewal” as part of 
its efforts to maintain power, the CCP leadership has embarked on a fantastic campaign for 
territorial acquisition in the East China Sea and the South China Sea in complete disregard of 
the post-war international order. China is expected to conform to international law, an essential 
tool to mediate between different civilizations and cultures. 
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History shall not be altered with the passing of time, 
and facts not erased by crafty denial.
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I. Introduction
China’s recent propaganda campaigns against 
Japan are extraordinary. They have been carried 
out systematically and deliberately in concerted 
efforts by government agencies around the world. 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi remarked in March 
2013, “The current situation has been caused by the 
Japanese side single-handedly,” regarding the tension 
surrounding the Senkaku Islands, “the root cause” 
of which, he charges, “lies in Japan’s illegal seizure 
and occupation of China’s territory.” He calls it “a 
challenge to the outcome of the victory of the Second 
World War.”1
The core issue of these campaigns is about 
“post-war international order”. President Xi Jinping 
often remarked on “the outcome of the victory of 
the Second World War and the post-war interna-
tional order” in his numerous speeches in 2014.2 
Ambassador Liu Jieyi to the United Nations also 
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spoke of “the post war international order” created 
by the United Nations Charter in his speech at the 
Security Council on 29 January 2014.3
All anti-Japan propaganda is tirelessly repeating 
that Japan is attempting to “distort,” “deny,” “chal-
lenge,” or “reverse” the world order established after 
World War II, and so Chinese propaganda machinery 
appeals to the rest of the world that “the outcome of 
the Second World War” and “the victory of the anti-
fascism war” must be protected and safeguarded. 
Such appeal seems to be intended to remind the 
United States that China and the United States were 
allies in their war against Japan and woo the United 
States to recognize China’s “major-country relation-
ship with the United States.”4
These relentless Chinese attacks on Japan 
bewilder us. Defeated at the war, we lost our pride 
and spirit as a nation, and have been resigned to 
accept the U.S.-made Constitution that says “we have 
determined to preserve our security and existence, 
trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving 
peoples of the world.”5 Since then, being placed, in 
effect, under the protectorate status of the United 
States that won the war, we are accustomed to being 
subject to the authority and power of the United 
States. In the meantime, we have supported the 
United Nations by providing an enormous amount 
of financial contributions in safeguarding and 
promoting the post-war international order.
Given that, it seems what Chinese leadership 
refers to as the “post-war international order” in the 
propaganda and what Japanese understand it to be are 
two different things. What does China really mean 
by “post-war international order”? Let us consider it 
in some detail below.
II. The U.N. Charter and the “Enemy State” 
Clauses
The U.N. Charter came into the present form 
through two different stages: it was based, first, 
on “Proposals for the Establishment of A General 
International Organization” adopted at the 1944 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference in which the represen-
tatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
the Soviet Union and the Republ ic of China 
participated;6 and subsequently, the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposals went through rounds of discussions, 
negotiations, and revisions at the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, which 
was held between 25 April and 26 June 1945 and in 
which 50 states participated7. It should be remem-
bered that both the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and 
the United Nations Charter were drafted and final-
ized well before Japan surrendered. The United 
States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union 
decided on post-war world power relations and 
the basic structure of what was referred to as the 
“World Organization” at the Yalta Conference held 
from 4 to 11 February 1945. These three states also 
decided at Yalta who should be allowed to partici-
pate in the San Francisco conference that would 
prepare a “Charter of the United Nations,” which 
would, in turn, shape the structure of “the post-war 
international order.” Those states that were invited 
to take part in the Conference were “(a) the United 
Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and (b) 
Such of the Associated Nations as have declared 
war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945.”8 It is 
thus obvious that “the post-war international order” 
Ambassador Liu Jieyi referred to was the world 
order system designed by Four Big Powers. In fact, 
it was done, more precisely, by the United States, 
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the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union since the 
participation of the Republic of China was marginal 
and perfunctory without any effective contribution to 
the Proposals.9 Moreover, the Republic of China was 
absent from the Yalta Conference in February 1945, 
which was the most important conference of all. The 
Charter of the United Nations was thus finalized 
and signed on 6 June 1945 by all those states that 
declared war on the Axis powers.10
Article 4(1) of the U.N. Charter is illustrative. It 
stipulates that “Membership in the United Nations is 
open to all other peace-loving states which accept 
the obligations contained in the present Charter . . . 
[emphasis added].” It is presumed that those states 
which participated in the San Francisco Conference 
and signed the U.N. Charter were peace-loving 
states because they declared war against the Axis 
Powers.11 The concept of “peace-loving states” was 
first introduced in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. 
Chapter II, paragraph 1 provided: “The Organization 
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality 
of all peace-loving states.”12 The U.N. Charter also 
derived in part from the Atlantic Charter issued by 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill 
on 14 August1941,13 which set forth eight “common 
principles in the national policies of their respective 
countries on which they base their hopes for a better 
future for the world.” The first three principles were 
as follows:
1. Their countries seek no aggrandizement, 
territorial or other.
2. They desire to see no territorial changes 
that do not accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned.
3. They respect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of Government under which 
they will live; and they wish to see sovereign 
rights and self-government restored to those 
who have been forcibly deprived of them.
With respect to the third principle, a certain 
change was introduced at the Yalta Conference. 
The Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference 
provides: “This is a pr inciple of the Atlantic 
Charter-the right of all peoples to choose the form 
of government under which they live-the restora-
tion of sovereign rights and self-government to those 
peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them 
by the aggressor nations.”14 By inserting the new 
phrase, “by the aggressor nations,” to the Atlantic 
Charter’s original phrase, “the restoration of sover-
eign rights and self-government to those peoples 
who have been forcibly deprived of them,” the Yalta 
conference limited the range of “peoples who have 
been forcibly deprived of” sovereign rights and 
self-government only to those peoples whose sover-
eignty and self-government were deprived of by “the 
aggressor nations.” In short, the Yalta conference in 
effect agreed that sovereign rights and self-govern-
ment would not be restored to those peoples who 
were deprived of them by “peace-loving states,” i.e., 
any member of the “United Nations.”15 Accordingly, 
they acquiesced in the French and the Dutch attempts 
to re-colonize Indochina and Indonesia, respectively, 
after Japan lost the war, and in the Soviet Union’s 
incorporation, and iron-fist rule, of Eastern European 
nations. As President Roosevelt candidly remarked in 
his address to Congress on 1 March 1945, “The final 
decisions in these areas are going to be made jointly; 
and therefore they will often be a result of give-and-
take compromise.”16 In other words, there are two 
different sets of rationales and criteria applicable 
separately to the victors and the vanquished of World 
War II.
When these historical developments are taken 
into account, we understand clearly the reason for the 
“enemy state” clauses in the Charter of the United 
Nations. Articles 53 and 107 read as follows:
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Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropri-
ate, utilize such regional arrangements or 
agencies for enforcement action under its 
authority. But no enforcement action shall 
be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization 
of the Security Council, with the exception 
of measures against any enemy state, as de-
fined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided 
for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional 
arrangements directed against renewal of ag-
gressive policy on the part of any such state, 
until such time as the Organization may, on 
request of the Governments concerned, be 
charged with the responsibility for preventing 
further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 
1 of this Article applies to any state which 
during the Second World War has been 
an enemy of any signatory of the present 
Charter.
Article 107
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate 
or preclude action, in relation to any state which 
during the Second World War has been an 
enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, 
taken or authorized as a result of that war by 
the Governments having responsibility for such 
action.17
III. China’s Conduct and the Post-War 
International Order
It is hard to appreciate exactly what the leader-
ship of the Communist Party of the People’s Republic 
of China understands by the phrase “the post-war 
international order” as the officials merely harp on 
the same slogan-like phrases, and not giving us any 
specific examples. What I suggest to do is to examine 
Japan’s post-war conduct on the basis of principles 
f lowing from the Atlantic Charter, through the 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and the Yalta Agreement 
to the Charter of the United Nations, which all 
constituted “the post-war international order.” Of 
these principles, the following are noteworthy: sover-
eign equality, the prohibition of the threat or use of 
force, territorial integrity, political independence, 
non-interference in domestic affairs, equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all, the settlement of inter-
national disputes by peaceful means, the Security 
Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security, the unanimity 
of major powers, regionalism, etc.. Some of these 
principles are newly developed principles added to 
the traditional corpus of international law, that has 
governed the traditional international order, which 
includes freedom of the high seas, and freedom 
of navigation. As the post-war international order 
continues to regulate today’s international relations, 
we should also add the entirely new regime of the 
continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.18
Sovereign Equality: Japan became a member of 
the United Nations Organization in 1956, four years 
after the entering into force of the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952. Yet, the “enemy state” 
clauses have remained in the Charter of the United 
Nations in denial of sovereign equality. Nonetheless, 
Japan has been paying the second largest financial 
contribution to the U.N. Organization in accordance 
with the principle of capacity to pay. Japan’s share 
assessed at 10.833% for 2013-15 is next to the United 
States contribution assessed at 22%.19 (Japan used to 
pay 19.468% for 2004-06.20)
In the case of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), the Communist government in Beijing of the 
PRC replaced the Nationalist government in Taipei 
of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1971 which had 
been representing “China” in the United Nations 
since 1945.21 The Nationalist government remained 
a member of the United Nations until 25 October 
1971 even after Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s successful 
revolution against the Chang Kai-shek government in 
1949. By automatic transfer of entitlement by change 
of representation, PRC became a permanent member 
of the Security Council and thus with veto power, 
the epitome of inequality of U.N. membership. These 
historical facts attest that there was little actual 
contribution by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
to what President Xi Jinping calls “the outcome of 
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the victory of the Second World War and the post-
war international order.”22 When the ROC partici-
pated in some of these international conferences 
where the future structure of post-war world order 
was discussed, its participation was perfunctory or 
non-existent. And the CCP was busy fighting against 
the Nationalist government and being pursued by the 
Nationalist army. The Japanese Imperial Army was 
actually defeated by the Nationalist government’s 
army which was aided by the United States and the 
United Kingdom as well as the Soviet Union, and not 
by the People’s Liberation Army of the CCP. Jung 
Chan and Jon Halliday’s Mao: The Unknown Story 
thus narrates:
Since then, history has been completely rewrit-
ten, and the world has come to believe that the 
CCP was more patriotic and keener to fight Japan 
than the Nationalists were – and that the CCP, 
not the Nationalists, was the party that proposed 
the United Front. All this is untrue.23
President Roosevelt invited Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek to Ca i ro in November and 
December 1943 over the objection of Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill because he grew increasingly 
concerned about the status of the ongoing conflict in 
China, and he not only became worried that China 
could give up its fight against Japan, but he also 
needed Chiang Kai-shek’s China to counter the pres-
ence of the United kingdom and the Soviet Union 
after the war in Asia.24 That was the extent of China’s 
participation. Chiang Kai-shek was not invited either 
to Yalta or Potsdam.
The prohibition of the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity of political inde-
pendence of any state: Thanks to its constitutional 
constraints as a pretext, the Japanese government 
had shirked away even from a call for participation 
by the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in U.N. Peace-
Keeping Operations until recently.25 Japan has not 
used a military fire power against any state since the 
end of World War II in 1945. The use of weapons by 
SDF personnel is significantly restricted as evidenced 
by the absence of a set of proper “rules of engage-
ment” that is common among all armed forces of 
any country as part of global standards. Thus, the 
legal basis of the “use of weapons” for the SDF is 
essentially reduced to the rights of the individual, 
as incorporated in Article 36 (self-defense) and 
Article 37 (emergency evacuation) of the Japanese 
Penal Code.26 It concerns with the preservation of 
life and body of individual SDF personnel, and it is 
nothing to do with their authority and duties. The 
action taken under Article 36 or Article 37 of the 
Penal Code must, like any civilian citizen’s action, 
be subject to review and judgment of civilian judges 
as to whether the requirements of legitimate defense 
and emergency evacuation are properly fulfilled 
or not. Besides, paragraph 1 of Article 24 of the 
International Peace-Keeping Operations Cooperation 
Law provides that a person who is engaged in inter-
national peace cooperation work in a host country 
“may use small arms if it is deemed necessary and 
unavoidable to defend the life and body of oneself, 
his other co-workers at the work site, or any other 
persons who are under his supervision as part of his 
duty, and it is deemed reasonable and necessary to 
deal with the situation.”27 It means that the use of 
weapons under paragraph 1 of Article 24 has nothing 
to do with the duty entrusted to the SDF personnel. 
Also, paragraph 4 of Article 24 says that “the provi-
sions of two preceding paragraphs shall be subject to 
the order of commanding officers present at the site, 
except when threat or harm to life and body is immi-
nent, leaving no time for such an order.” With respect 
to the use of weapons, however, paragraph 6 of 
Article 24 essentially denies the raison d’être of the 
weapon by stipulating that except under the provi-
sions of Article 36 or Article 37 of the Penal Code, “it 
shall not harm people.”
The use of weapons is thus extremely restricted 
as the conduct of the SDF is regulated by the Police 
Duties Execution Law28 as the SDF does not have 
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the legal status or treatment normally accorded to 
any military forces of an independent state. SDF 
personnel are all subject to the same civil jurisdic-
tion as that of civilians because there is no military 
tribunal system.29 Legally, therefore, the enormity of 
fire power at its disposal notwithstanding, the SDF 
is the same as the police force; every aspect of its 
competence is prescribed by domestic law, according 
to what is commonly referred to as “a positive list” 
and nothing can be done unless it is so empowered 
explicitly in a piece of legislation.30 The SDF is a 
make-believe military force!
Let us take a look at China’s case, i.e., the conduct 
relating to the People’s Republic of China since its 
establishment in 1949. The first breach of “the post-
war international order” was the invasion of Tibet in 
1950, and then, the outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950. The PRC’s role in the Korean War was 
significant, in that it sent combat troops ostensibly 
termed “voluntary troops” of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army, to intervene in the war against U.N. 
Forces in October 1950. Since then, the list of inter-
national incidents in which direct Chinese involve-
ment had been present has grown longer:
1950 : the invasion of Tibet;
1950-53 : the Korean War;
1954-55 and 1958 : the constant shelling of 
  Kinmen (or Quemoy) Island by
  the Chinese People’s Liberation Army;
1959 : the Chinese-India War;
1969 : the Chinese-Soviet Border War;
1974 : the Battle of the Spratly Islands with 
  Vietnam;
1979 : the Chinese-Vietnam War;
1984 : the Chinese-Vietnamese Border 
  Conflict;
1988 : the Naval Battle with Vietnam at 
  Johnson South Reef in the Spratly  
  Islands;
1995-96 : the Taiwan Strait Crisis; etc.
The list can go on, without counting the inva-
sions by proxy, i.e., these so-called home grown 
communist insurgencies that were said to be insti-
gated and funded by China, of Malaya, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. Never in the 
history of post-war international relations has any 
state been direct party to more conflicts in such a 
short span of time with its neighboring states than 
China. It is the People’s Republic of China that 
breached such basic international principles as the 
prohibition of the use or threat of force against the 
territorial integrity of states; and the principle of 
peaceful resolution of international disputes. These 
are the most fundamental principles of the post-
war international order China speaks of. China’s 
unabashed claim that the South China Sea belongs 
to China by unilaterally drawing the Nine-dash Line 
has stunned the world.31 Such egregious claim is, 
as analyzed below in some detail,32 not only a total 
denial of basic principles relating to “territorial sea,” 
“maritime boundary delimitation,” and “high seas,” 
but also the violation of relevant provisions relating 
to “archipelagic States” (Article 46), “straight archi-
pelagic baselines” (Article 47), “traditional fishing 
rights” (Article 51), to name a few, of the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.33
Moreover, the Chinese forcible control of Tibet 
and Xinjiang Uyghur denies equal rights and the 
right of self-determination of peoples.34 China that is 
a permanent member of the Security Council which 
has primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace, is acting to the contrary and 
undermining the function of the Security Council 
from within.
President Xi Jinping recently claimed that “[i]t is 
not in the genes of the Chinese nation to invade other 
countries or seek world hegemony.”35 Yes, of course, 
Genghis Khan’s 100-year long Yuan Dynasty was 
Mongolian. The 270-year long Qing Dynasty was 
Manchurian. There is no wonder. Tibet, Xinjiang 
Uyghur, and Inner Mongolia do not belong to China. 
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But these past and present records as briefly enumer-
ated above do not indicate that the same claim can be 
made of the leadership of the CCP. As a contempo-
rary observer of The New York Times noted:
In the six decades since coming to power, 
China’s Communist Party has devoted enormous 
resources to composing historical narratives 
that seek to legitimize its rule and obfuscate its 
failures. . . . When it comes to China’s ethnic 
minorities, the party-run history machine is espe-
cially single-minded in its effort to promote story 
lines that portray Uighurs, Mongolians, Tibetans 
and other groups as contended members of an 
extended family whose traditional homelands 
have long been part of the Chinese nation.36
Denial by China of “the post-war international 
order” is not confined to the conduct of interna-
tional relations, but extends to the ruthless and forc-
ible suppression by the military of ‘89 Democracy 
Movement at Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989. 
It epitomizes China’s denial of “human rights and 
fundamental freedoms” that touch on the nerve of the 
Communist Party leadership and squarely demon-
strates China’s disregard of international concern in 
favour of “domestic jurisdiction” under the pretext 
of the principle of “non-interference in domestic 
affairs.”37 As Mr. Liu Jieyi, Chinese Ambassador 
to the UN, said nonchalantly recently, “China is 
opposed to exploiting the existence of large-scale 
violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea as a reason to include the situa-
tion in [North Korea] in the agenda of the Security 
Council.”38 He believes that “[t]he Security Council 
is not a forum designed for involvement in human 
rights issues, and still less should human rights issues 
be politicized.”39 To him or the CCP leadership, for 
that matter, large-scale and gross violations of human 
rights in Tibet, Xinjiang Uyghur or Inner Mongolia, 
let alone Tiananmen Square, are not “issues that 
really concern international peace and security.”40
These events are current and present affairs, not 
like the atrocities committed by a brief aberration 
of Japan of 70-odd years ago. It is high time that 
the leadership of the CCP reflected on President Xi 
Jinping’s statement: “[H]istory shall not be altered 
with the passing of time, and facts not erased by 
crafty denial.”41
How did Japan conduct itself in the pre-World 
War II era, in which Japan was a new player in 
the world arena? Here is an observation by Eliza 
Ruhamah Scidmore (1856-1928), an American 
writer, photographer and geographer, who became 
the first female board member of the National 
Geographic Society:
The manner in which the Japanese government 
cared for the 79,367 Russian prisoners of war, 
detained at twenty-seven military posts, during 
the long campaign in Manchuria was so strik-
ingly in contrast to the way in which European 
nations had dealt with the same problem within 
the same half century, that it is a question 
for Peace Congress yet to debate whether the 
Japanese or the European way is right or best.
Since the Russo-Japanese war, the Ital ian 
campaign in Tripoli, the war of the Balkan allies 
against Turkey, and the war between the allies 
themselves have presented the extremest contrast 
to the Japanese way. Christian Europe has proved 
itself, in these instances at least, still mediaeval if 
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not barbaric in the treatment of prisoners of war, 
despite the Geneva and Hague conventions.42
Such honorable record of conduct that had 
continued through World War I to the 1920s was 
tarnished by atrocities committed by some elements 
of the same military in the course of its war against 
the Allied Forces. Even under such an aberrant 
period of oppressive fascism the Japanese diplomat 
Chiune Sugihara disobeyed his government’s orders 
and continued issuing visas in 1940 to allow 6000 
Jews to escape from Nazis to Japan.
Recent remarks by Australian Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott on Japan attest to the conduct of its 
international relations in the post-World War II.43 
“Japan should be judged on its actions today, not on 
its actions 70-odd years ago and Japan has been an 
exemplary international citizen in the post-war era,” 
said Abbott. Rather than focusing on the conduct 
of 70-odd year old past, he suggested, “These are 
the standards by which Japan should be judged … 
because Japan today is a radically different country 
than it was 70 years ago.” And he acknowledged, “At 
every step of the way since 1945 Japan has been a 
country which has acted in accordance with the rule 
of law.”44
IV. The United States’ Betrayal of
Japan’s Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands
Why, then, is China relentlessly broadcasting 
anti-Japanese propaganda while concealing its own 
historical and present records of numerous breaches 
of principles of the post-war international order? On 
27 September 2012 Chinese Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi made an outlandish statement on the status 
of the Senkaku Islands, which he referred to as “the 
Diaoyu Islands, as part of his speech at the U.N. 
General Assembly.45 As set out below, Mr. Yang’s 
obstinate factual presentation distorts the status of 
the Senkaku Islands, which form part of the Ryukyu 
(Okinawa) Islands. The Ryukyu or Okinawa Islands 
have never been part of mainland China nor Taiwan, 
and they were not discussed in connection with the 
conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895. Foreign 
Minister Yang said,
Japan seized these islands in 1895 at the end 
of the Sino-Japanese War and forced the then 
Chinese government to sign an unequal treaty to 
cede these islands and other Chinese territories to 
Japan. After the Second World War, the Diaoyu 
Dao islands and other Chinese territories occu-
pied by Japan were returned to China in accor-
dance with the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam 
Proclamation and other international documents. 
By taking such unilateral actions as the so-called 
“island purchase”, the Japanese government has 
grossly violated China’s sovereignty. This is an 
outright denial of the outcomes of the victory 
of the world anti-fascist war and poses a grave 
challenge to the post-war international order and 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations. The moves taken by Japan are 
totally illegal and invalid. They can in no way 
change the historical fact that Japan stole Diaoyu 
Dao and its affiliated islands from China and the 
fact that China has territorial sovereignty over 
them [emphasis added].46
Mr. Yang’s use of the term “stole” must have 
come from the Cairo Communique which said that 
“all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, 
such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, 
shall be restored to the Republic of China.” But 
none of the participants at the Cairo meeting signed 
the Communique, and the U.S. State Department’s 
official view is simple and unequivocal: “The Cairo 
30
Journal  of  Policy  Studies   No.49  (March  2015)
47  U.S. Department of State,/FRUS, 1951, Korea and China, The China area, at 1481; available at <http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-
idx?type=goto&id=FRUS.FRUS1951v07p2&page=1481&isize=text>
48  Drew Middleton, “Cairo Formosa Declaration Out of Date, Says Churchill,” New York Times, 2 Feb. 1955.
49  Chen Jia, “Major world powers urged to stick to Cairo Declaration terms,” 2 Dec. 2013, China Daily, USA; available at <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/
world/2013-12/02/content_17143857.htm>
50  Roosevelt-Chiang Dinner Meeting, 23 Nov. 1943, 8 p.m., 5. Proceedings of the Conference, at 324; available at <http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/
EFacs/1943CairoTehran/reference/frus.frus1943cairotehran.i0011.pdf>
51  Statement by President Kennedy Upon Signing Order Relating to the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 19 Mar. 1962: “I recognize the Ryukyus 
to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the free World will permit their restoration to full 
Japanese sovereignty;” available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9114>
  See John Foster Dulles: “In the face of this division of allied opinion, the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain 
residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as 
administering authority.” John Foster Dulles’s Speech at the San Francisco Peace Conference, 5 Sept. 1951; available at <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.
ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPUS/19510905.S1E.html
  See also Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “The U. S. Role in the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands, 1945-1971,” China Quarterly, No. 
161, Mar. 2000, 95-123; available at <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/655982?uid=3738824&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21103230280431>. 
52  Doc. 133. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Peterson) to President Nixon, 7 June 1971, para.. 3(c); 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 133; available at <http://history.state.gov/
historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d133> The U.S. Government takes the same strange, self-serving position on the Philippines sovereingnty of 
Scarsborough Shoal which was ceded to the United States by Spain by the Treaty of Washington in 1900.
  TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR CESSION OF OUTLYING ISLANDS OF THE 
PHILIPPINES [1900];  available at <http://www.gov.ph/1900/11/07/the-philippine-claim-to-a-portion-of-north-borneo-treaty-between-the-kingdom-
spain-and-the-united-states-of-america-for-cession-of-outlying-islands-of-the-philippines-1900/>
declaration manifested our intention. It did not 
itself constitute a cession of territory.”47 And Prime 
Minister Churchill, direct party to the Communique 
himself, testified that Formosa would not be returned 
to the People’s Republic of China at one of sessions 
on 1 February 1955 of the Parliament and said that 
“The declaration contains merely a statement of 
common purpose.”48 Given these outright nega-
tion of the Communique, it is understandable that 
the Chinese government cannot help becoming 
concerned about the real effect of the Communique.49
The Republic of China, then, was a member of 
the Security Council, and must have enjoyed count-
less opportunities in which it could have asserted 
its position on the status of the Senkaku Islands. 
Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek himself took part 
in the Cairo meeting. There was no mention of the 
Ryukyu Islands, of which the Senkaku Islands are 
part. The following is the translation done by the 
U.S. State Department of the notes of the meeting 
between Roosevelt and Chang Kai-shek prepared by 
the Chinese counterpart:
The President then referred to the question of 
the Ryuku [sic] Islands and enquired more than 
once whether China would want the Ryukus. 
The Generalissimo replied that China would be 
agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukus by 
China and the United States and, eventually, joint 
administration by the two countries under the 
trusteeship of an international organization.50
The Ryukyu Islands were offered to Chang 
K a i- shek  on  a  pla t e  by  Roosevel t ,  but  t he 
Generalissimo declined the offer by counteroffer-
ing the “joint occupation” of the Ryukyu Islands. 
Reluctance on the Generalissimo’s part was under-
standable because he knew that the Ryukyu Islands 
did not belong to China. Since then, the United 
States had been the sole and exclusive administrator 
of the Ryukyu Islands until the Ryukyu Islands were 
returned to Japan in 1972. It must be remembered 
that the United States acknowledged all along that 
Japan had residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu 
Islands.51
The Nixon Administration deliberately created 
the problem of the Senkaku Islands by leaving the 
sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands out of the Ryukyu 
(Okinawa) Islands. The Nixon Administration 
did so by treating the sovereignty of the Senkaku 
Islands as being undetermined in order to appease 
the then-Republic of China’s government on Taiwan 
whose large textile exports to the U.S. were creating 
a serious problem for President Nixon’s southern 
strategy campaign for re-election in 1971.52 Also, at 
that time, the U.S. was secretly negotiating with the 
Communist government in Beijing for rapproche-
ment and possible Nixon’s visit to Beijing.
The Nixon Administration’s utmost desire for the 
successful re-election campaign and historic United 
States rapprochement with Beijing necessitated it 
not to displease either the Communist government in 
Beijing which started claiming the Senkaku Islands 
for the first time in 1971 since the U.N. study indi-
cated the probable presence of substantial energy 
deposits in the area around the Senkaku Islands or 
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the Nationalist government in Taipei which claimed 
them likewise. Thus, the United States betrayed 
Japan by changing its long-standing recognition 
of Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over the Ryukyu 
(Okinawa) Islands which include the Senkaku Islands 
to the strictly neutral position that the Okinawa 
reversion treaty did not prejudice anyone’s claims 
to the “disputed” islands. That was a non-historical 
political concoction to serve the self-convenience of 
the time at the expense of Japan’s sovereignty.53
That is the origin of the Senkaku Islands problem. 
It does not make sense for the United States to per-
petuate this fictitious election gimmick of 1971. Any 
question about the status of the Senkaku Islands must 
be answered in the context of Article 3 of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty, which placed “Nansei Shoto, 
south of 29° North latitude (including the Ryukyu 
and the Daito Islands)”under the United States’ trust 
as “sole administrating authority.”54 It is obvious 
that the area includes the Ryukyu Islands, which 
in turn include the Senkaku Islands. That has been 
the consistent position of the U.S. government from 
Dean Acheson through John Foster Dulles to John F. 
Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
The Cairo Communique was, as the principal 
parties professed, nothing but the expression of 
common purpose, and as such, it bears no legal 
effect.
V. Ramifications of the “Enemy State” 
Clauses
As discussed above, it was the victors who called 
themselves “United Nations” of “peace-loving states” 
that established “the post-war international order.” 
And China is now acting as such with the “enemy 
state” clauses, referred to above, which allow any 
state responsible for action taken as a result of the 
war, to take enforcement action against any enemy 
state without the Security Council’s authorization. 
China’s reaction to Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s 
remarks in 2012 at the U.N. General Assembly that 
“the Senkaku Islands are an inherent territory of 
Japan in light of historical facts and based upon 
international law,”55 attests to it. Chinese Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang thus responded: “It 
is outrageous that a defeated country is now trying to 
occupy the territory of a victor.”56
For Japan that was party to the war as an “enemy 
state,” it is comforting and self-serving as well to 
talk about the death of the “enemy state” clauses and 
the absence of real legal effect of the “enemy state” 
clauses. As all former enemy states became members 
of the United Nations as “peace-loving states,” the 
term “enemy state” has lost its practical meaning.57 
Nonetheless, only Article 107 is under Chapter XVII: 
Transitional Security Arrangements, and the desig-
nation of “enemy state” is not subject to any stipula-
tions as to the conditions precedent to the expiration 
of the status of “enemy state” such as a time frame 
for conditions to be fulfilled or events to take place. 
In short, there is no condition that tells you when you 
will no longer be an enemy state.
The General Assembly’s resolution adopted 
on 11 December 1995 at the 50th session deals, in 
part, with the question of the deletion of the “enemy 
state” clauses.58 It recognizes “that, having regard 
to the substantial changes that have taken place in 
the world, the ‘enemy State’ clauses in Articles 53, 
77 and 107 of the Charter of the United Nations 
have become obsolete,”59 but the resolution merely 
expresses “its intention to initiate” the amendment 
procedure set out in Article 108 of the U.N. Charter 
“by the deletion of the ‘enemy State’ clauses from 
Articles 53, 77 and 107 at its earliest appropriate 
future session.”60 Likewise, General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/60/1 of 16 September 2005 on 
“2005 World Summit Outcome” merely states that 
“we resolve to delete references to ‘enemy States’ in 
Articles 53, 77, and 107 of the Charter.”61 There is 
no binding effect in this provision, and the “enemy 
state” clauses remain there, and there are always 
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some people who will invoke them as China does 
surreptitiously today.62
Germany, another “enemy state,” entered 
into a treaty on the final settlement with respect 
to Germany with the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France at the time 
of collapse of the “Berlin Wall” in 1990 and when 
the unification of East and West Germanys was under 
way.63 Article 7 of the Treaty is significant, as set out 
below:
ARTICLE 7
(1) The French Republic, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
United States of America hereby terminate 
their rights and responsibilities relating to 
Berlin and to Germany as a whole. As a 
result, the corresponding, related quadripar-
tite agreements, decisions and practices are 
terminated and all related Four Power institu-
tions are dissolved. 
(2) The United Germany shall have accordingly 
full sovereignty over its internal and external 
affairs.
With this Treaty, the effect of the “enemy state” 
clauses is understood to have expired with respect to 
Germany. Likewise, it is generally understood that a 
peace treaty between any of the United Nations, i.e., 
the victors, and the vanquished, will terminate the 
former’s right to take military measures against any 
“enemy state” without the Security Council’s authori-
zation under Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter. 
Normally, peace treaties stipulate the prohibition of 
the use of force between the contracting parties to 
the treaties, and which directly bind them under the 
Treaty on Renunciation of War (the Kellogg-Brian 
Treaty) and international customary law.
Given the situation where the deletion of the 
“enemy state” clauses of the U.N. Charter is unre-
alistic, it would be more useful to seek to conclude 
bi-lateral t reat ies with major United Nations 
members with a view to terminating the rights and 
responsibilities relating to the “enemy state” clauses. 
The Japan and Soviet Union Joint Communique of 
18 April 1991 provides that two parties confirm that 
the “enemy state” clauses have lost meaning.64 As for 
China, although the China-Japan Peace Treaty does 
not refer to the “enemy state” clauses, its Article 1 
stipulates as follows:65
1. The Contracting Parties shall develop rela-
tions of perpetual peace and friendship 
between the two countries on the basis of 
the principles of mutual respect for sover-
eignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit 
and peaceful co-existence.
2. The Contracting Parties confirm that, in 
conformity with the foregoing principles and 
the principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, they shall in their mutual relations 
settle all disputes by peaceful means and 
shall refrain from the use or threat of force.
I believe nobody would object to the provi-
sions of Article 1 of the Peace Treaty above. But, as 
mentioned earlier, the People’s Republic of China’s 
records abound in breaches of the basic principles 
of the post-war international order. It is pertinent 
to recall now what Hegel said: “The relationship 
between states is a relationship of independent units 
which make mutual stipulations but at the same time 
stand above these stipulations.”66 Whether or not 
these states’ treaties are observed, that is, whether or 
not “their rights are actualized” depends on “their 
own particular wills.” “Consequently,” continues 
Hegel, “the universal determination of international 
law remains only an obligation, and the [normal] 
condition will be for relations governed by treaties 
to alternate with the suspension [Aufhebung] of such 
relations.”67
So the ultimate question is what is “renewal of 
aggressive policy on the part of” an enemy state 
under Article 53 of the U.N. Charter. And who is 
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going to determine that such “renewal of aggressive 
policy” is undertaken by an “enemy state” to allow 
“measures against [such] enemy state” to be taken? 
Is it limited to “regional arrangements” or “regional 
agencies”? Is any member state of the United Nations 
not related to either such regional arrangements or 
regional agencies authorized to invoke the provisions 
of Article 53? There is, however, no specific provi-
sion dealing with any of these questions.
The second set of more serious questions relates 
to the duration of such measures being taken against 
the enemy state even though Article 53 stipulates 
“until such time as the Organization may, on request 
of the Governments concerned, be charged with the 
responsibility for preventing further aggression by 
such a state.” In the absence of the Government’s 
request, is the Security Council allowed to act on 
its own initiative to exercise “responsibility for 
preventing further aggression” by such enemy state? 
The United Nations’ practice would indicate that 
the Security Council has its own authority to act in 
taking charge of its primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security by 
“preventing further aggression” by such an “enemy 
state.” Yet, it is, after all, any member state of the 
United Nations that may determine, according to 
what Hegel referred to as its own “particular will,”68 
when and how to act in taking measures against such 
“enemy state.”
Whether in the face of “armed attack” under 
Article 51 or “renewal of aggressive policy” under 
Article 53, a member state’s initial freedom of action 
does not require the Security Council’s authorization, 
and that freedom of action may continue until the 
Security Council acts on the matter in question. As 
the conflict continues on the battle ground, another 
battle for a Security Council decision begins inside 
the Security Council. There is one critical question 
regarding the provisions of Article 23, paragraph 
3 which stipulates that “a party to a dispute shall 
abstain from voting.”69 Since no “action . . . taken or 
authorized . . . by the Governments having respon-
sibility for such action” is precluded by the U.N. 
Charter under Article 107, would such measures 
taken by the Government concerned be subject to the 
Security Council’s deliberation and vote? There are 
many areas of controversy that need to be clarified as 
the past drags on into the 21st century.
VI. China’s Fantastic Claims for Territorial 
and Maritime Acquisition in the East China 
and the South China Seas
China abruptly incorporated the Senkaku Islands 
(which it calls Diaoyu Islands) within its Law on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 25 
February 1992.70 Article 2 of the Law stipulates as 
follows:
The territorial sea of the People’s Republic of 
China is the sea belt adjacent to the land territory 
and the internal waters of the People’s Republic 
of China.
The land territory of the People’s Republic of 
China includes the mainland of the People’s 
Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan 
and all islands appertaining thereto including the 
Diaoyu Islands; the Penghu Islands; the Dongsha 
Islands; the Xisha Islands; the Zhongsha Islands 
and the Nansha Islands; as well as all the other 
islands belonging to the People’s Republic of 
China [emphasis added].
The waters on the landward side of the baselines 
of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic 
of China constitute the internal waters of the 
People’s Republic of China.71
That provision is designed to characterize Japan’s 
effective control of the Senkaku Islands and its rein-
vigorated policy to reinforce its effective control 
in the Senkaku Islands as “renewal of aggressive 
policy” of Japan, an “enemy state”. It could be used 
as a pretext to capture the Senkaku Islands forcibly 
in accordance with Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. 
Charter.
Aside from Japan’s Senkaku Islands, and the 
Penghu Islands and the Dongsha Islands clearly 
belonging to, and claimed by, Taiwan, all other 
islands named in the Law, i.e., Xisha (Paracel) 
Islands, the Zhongsha (Scarborough) Islands and 
Nansha (Spratly) Islands, are all subject to multiple 
territorial claims by any of neighboring states like 
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia 
or Indonesia. Furthermore, in May 2009 China sent 
two Notes Verbales to the UN Secretary General 
requesting that they be circulated to all UN Member 
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76  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [hereinafter “LOS Convention”], 10 Dec. 1982, entered into force 16 Nov. 1994, 1833 UNTS 397; 
available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm>. China ratified the Convention on 7 June 1996.
77  Id. at Article 15.
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States.72 The 2009 Note Verbales included China’s 
unilateral declaration of the Nine-dashed Line that 
engulfed the entire South China Sea as China’s 
territorial sea.73 The 2009 Note Verbales stated the 
following:
China has indisputable sovereignty over the 
islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent 
waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdic-
tion over the relevant waters as well as the seabed 
and subsoil thereof (see attached map). The 
above position is consistently held by the Chinese 
government, and is widely known by the interna-
tional community.74
But China’s claim that “China has indisputable 
sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea” 
sounds like an oxymoron in the face of such claim 
being disputed by China’s neighboring States having 
equally competing claims over these islands.
In 2011 China sent out a third Note Verbale 
relating to the same subject matter, asserting that 
“China’s sovereignty and related rights and juris-
diction in the South China Sea are supported by 
abundant historical and legal evidence.”75 There 
have been a few different versions of the dashed 
line map produced by both the Republic of China 
and the People’s Republic of China, none of which 
was accompanied by any of geographic coordinates 
specifying the location of any of the dashes. China 
has not published that critical information to date.
Under international law, maritime boundaries are 
established by agreement between neighboring States, 
and Article 15 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),76 governing 
delimitation of the territorial sea between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts, stipulates:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or 
adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is 
entitled, failing agreement between them to the
contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the 
median line every point of which is equidistant 
from the nearest points on the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial seas of each 
of the two States is measured.77
“The above provision,” continues Article 15, 
“does not apply, however, where it is necessary by 
reason of historic title or other special circumstances 
to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in 
a way which is at variance therewith.”78 Given the 
breadth of the territorial sea of a State is set “up to 
a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured 
from baselines,”79 any of the nine-dashes unilat-
erally proclaimed by China are all closer to the 
surrounding coasts of neighboring States than they 
are to the closest islands within the South China 
Sea. Such unilaterally proclaimed nine-dashed line 
is contrary to the provisions of the LOS Convention 
and customary international law. China understood 
it perfectly well. The 1958 Declaration on China’s 
Territorial Sea states:
This [12-nautical mile territorial sea] provision 
applies to all territories of the People’s Republic 
of China, including the Chinese mainland and 
its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its 
surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands and all 
other islands belonging to China which are sepa-
rated from the mainland and its coastal islands 
by the high seas [emphasis added].80
According to the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas, the term “high seas” means “all parts of the 
sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in 
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the internal waters of a state.”81 The LOS Convention 
further refined the scope of the high seas to mean:
“all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or 
in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipe-
lagic waters of an archipelagic State. This article 
does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms 
enjoyed by all States in the exclusive economic 
zone in accordance with article 58.”82
Thus, the reference in the 1958 Declaration on 
China’s Territorial Sea to “the high seas” separating 
China’s mainland and coastal islands from “all 
other islands belonging to China” underscores that 
“in 1958,” as Kevin Baumert and Brian Melchior 
concluded, “China made no claim to the entirety 
of the ocean space within the dashed l ine.”83 
Accordingly, China’s third Note Verbale claims, 
albeit unsurely, “abundant historical and legal 
evidence [emphasis added]”84 to justify its unilateral 
assertion of sovereignty over the vast area of the 
South China Sea. Nonetheless, evidence for such 
historic rights is nil. Besides, the LOS Convention 
recognizes only two places for historic claims: 
“historic bays” under Article 10 and “historic title” 
in connection with the delimitation of territorial 
sea boundary under Article 15. Nor do the LOS 
Convention’s provisions relating to the EEZ, the 
continental shelf, and the high seas contain excep-
tions for historic claims. Rather, the LOS Convention 
provides specific provisions governing activities in 
the sea. Except “traditional fishing rights” referred 
to in the context of archipelagic waters,85 the LOS 
Convention does not recognize a “traditional” or 
“historic” basis for sovereignty, sovereign rights 
or jurisdiction.86 As the judgment of the ICJ in the 
Gulf of Maine case stated, “[the Chamber] can 
only confirm its decision not to ascribe any decisive 
weight . . . to the antiquity or continuity of fishing 
activities carried on in the past” in these expanses 
that were part of the high seas.87 Thus, the ICJ 
concluded that the LOS Convention prevails over 
whatever enjoyment other States had before the 
coastal States had set up exclusive 200-mile fishery 
zones. The ICJ thus observed, “Third States and their 
nationals found themselves deprived of any right of 
access to the sea areas within those zones and of any 
position of advantage they might have been able to 
achieve within them.”88
Given these circumstances, China’s foreign 
policy of late has been anything but contrary to 
China’s professed principles of its foreign policy. In 
the words of President Xi Jinping ,
Disputes and differences between countries 
should be resolved through dialogue, consultation 
and peaceful means. We should increase mutual 
trust, and settle disputes and promote security 
through dialogue. Flexing military muscles only 
reveals the lack of moral grounds or vision rather 
than reflecting one’s strength.89
But when it comes to implementing these prin-
ciples, China has engaged in volatile confrontations 
with several neighbors over claims in the South 
China Sea, not to mention air and maritime incur-
sions around the Senkaku Islands: confrontations 
with Vietnam over an oil rig constructed in disputed 
waters of the Paracel Islands; a naval stand-off with 
the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal; escala-
tion of disputes with all Southeast Asian countries 
over the Spratly Islands. China’s assertion sounds 
hollow:
We should urge upon all parties to abide by inter-
national law and well-recognized basic principles 
governing international relations and use widely 
applicable rules to tell right from wrong and 
pursue peace and development.90
Accordingly, the Philippines filed its complaint 
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against China over the legality of the Nine-dash 
Line for resolution by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.91 China reacted negatively accusing 
the Philippines of dragging China into arbitration 
proceedings.92 Asked about “a deadline” set by the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration to respond to the 
Philippines submission, China’s Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Hong Lei gave a cryptic reply: 
“China does not accept nor participate in the arbi-
tration case filed by the Philippines. This position 
remains unchanged.”93 Subsequently, China issued 
its position paper on the case.94 China has always 
insisted that disputes should be “peacefully resolved 
through negotiations between the countries directly 
concerned.”95 The point here is patently obvious. It is 
China that is in a far stronger position, economically 
and militarily, and in a more advantageous position 
geographically, having more leverage than any other 
negotiating parties. Whether negotiations are bilat-
eral or otherwise is irrelevant in this respect. And 
so China invokes the Declaration on the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea, on which China 
places so much reliance, that stipulates at paragraph 
4 as follows:
The Parties concerned undertake to resolve their 
territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful 
means, without resorting to the threat or use of 
force, through friendly consultations and negotia-
tions by sovereign states directly concerned, in 
accordance with universally recognized princi-
ples of international law, including the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.96
China insists that “with respect to all the disputes 
between China and the Philippines in the South 
China Sea, including the Philippines’ claims in this 
arbitration, the only means of settlement as agreed 
by the two sides is negotiations, to the exclusion of 
any other means.”97 That, I must say, is an overstate-
ment by resorting to the question-begging Latinism 
inclusio unius est exlusio alterius [The inclusion 
of one is the exclusion of another].98 Nowhere does 
any agreement to which the Philippines is party, be 
it bilateral or multilateral, state that it agrees to have 
peaceful settlement by only negotiations to the exclu-
sion of any other means of peaceful settlement.
Moreover, China insists that the Philippines, or 
for that matter, ASEAN member States by implica-
tion, and China have agreed “to settle their relevant 
disputes by negotiations, without setting any time 
limit for the negotiations”! The absence of the speci-
fied time limit only means that such negotiations 
should be completed within a reasonable period 
of time. The settlement of disputes by negotiations 
does not require the parties to negotiate indefinitely 
while denying a party the option of concluding no 
settlement would be reached and to seek some other 
peaceful means of its own choice.99 Besides, the 
parties are under an obligation to negotiate in good 
faith.100
President Xi insists that “there should be just 
one law that applies to all. There is no such law that 
applies to others but not oneself, or vice versa.”101 In 
this connection, I support the following statement of 
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his policy:
Security should be universal. All countries 
have the right to participate in international and 
regional security affairs on an equal footing and 
shoulder the shared responsibility to maintain 
security both internationally and in various 
regions. We should champion common, compre-
hensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, 
and respect and ensure every country’s security. 
It is unacceptable to have security just for one 
country or some countries while leaving the rest 
insecure, and less should one be allowed to seek 
the so-called “absolute security” of itself at the 
expense of others’ security.102
Japan is coming out of a long post-war period 
of indulgence in minding its own business. Japan is 
coming of age as a normal country to “shoulder the 
shared responsibility,” to use President Xi’s phrase, 
in international and regional security affairs. As 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said,
Japan is now working to change its legal basis 
for security so that we can act jointly with other 
countries in as many ways as possible. . . . We 
want to make Japan a country that will work to 
build an international order that upholds the rule 
of law. Our desire is to make Japan a country 
that is all the more willing to contribute to peace 
in the region and beyond. It is for this reason 
that Japan has raised the banner of “Proactive 
Contribution to Peace.”103
Mr. Abe’s remarks befittingly echo President Xi’s 
statement:
As China develops, it will better play its role as 
a major responsible country. We will be more 
active in working to uphold world peace, advo-
cate common, comprehensive, cooperative and 
sustainable security and commit ourselves to 
peacefully resolving disputes through consulta-
tion and negotiation. We will firmly uphold the 
UN-centered post-war international order and 
actively participate in UN peacekeeping missions 
and regional security dialogue and cooperation.104
China is, in the words of President Xi Jinping, 
“actively working towards building a new model of 
major-country relationship with the United States.”105 
Ultimately, it seems China aspires to control the 
western half of the Pacific Ocean. At the present, 
China is in the process of establishing effective 
control within the First Island Chain, which stretches 
from southern Kyushu, through the Ryukyu archi-
pelago, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, Malaysia, 
and to the Strait of Malacca. It will encompass the 
Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China 
Sea. To that end, the control of the Senkaku Islands 
is indispensable. The recent declaration of an Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over a large 
portion of the East China Sea, which includes the 
Senkaku Islands, is a clear indication of this ultimate 
goal.106
China recently unveiled a new map showing the 
Ten-dash Line,107 which would potentially threaten 
freedom of navigation through the most important 
three straits in the south: the Strait of Malacca 
between Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, connecting 
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean; the 
Sunda Straight between Sumatra and Java; and 
the Lombok Strait between the islands of Bali and 
Lombok, both connecting the Java Sea and the Indian 
Ocean. These three straits are strategically the most 
important controlling points of sea lanes connecting 
the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Also in 
the north, there are two important straits: the Bashi 
Channel in the Strait of Luzon between Taiwan 
and the Philippines; and the Miyako Strait between 
the Okinawa Island and the Miyako Island. These 
two straits in the north are for the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army Navy to access the Pacific Ocean. 
For the first time in 2010 the PLA Navy transited 
through the Miyako Strait.108 Since then, the passage 
of the PLA Navy through the Miyako Strait has 
become an annual event for the Chinese naval 
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exercise in the Pacific Ocean, which is necessary for 
it to develop into a “blue-water” navy. Alarmed by 
these developments, Japan moved to take necessary 
measures.109 With the transit of the PLA Navy fleet 
through the Miyako Strait established as a routine 
manoeuvre, China is now positing itself to deal with 
the next hurdle, i.e., the Second Island Chain that 
runs from the Izu Islands through the Bonins Islands, 
Guam, the Marianas Islands, and the Caroline 
Islands to Papua New Guinea. The Bashi Channel in 
the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines 
allows the PLA Navy fleet to return to the South 
China Sea without going back to the Miyako Strait, 
which is subject to Japanese surveillance.
It seems that all anti-Japan propaganda is 
designed to create a favorable environment for 
China’s eventual action against Japan to capture 
the Senkaku Islands in order to deny U.S. and 
Japan’s naval forces access to the East China Sea 
and to secure the PLA Navy’s access to the Pacific 
Ocean.110 The “enemy state” clauses are the ready-
made provisions that China could invoke in the use 
of force against Japan as if such action would be in 
accordance with the U.N. Charter, But why is China 
expanding by force the acquisition of islands and 
territorial waters in such a vast area of the South 
China Sea in the name of “the realization of the 
Chinese dream of the great national renewal”?111 
Hegel suggests an answer to the question: “nations 
[Nationen] t roubled by civi l dissension gain 
internal peace as a result of wars with their external 
enemies.”112
More  f unda ment a l ly,  however,  wit h  t he 
Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989 still fresh in 
its memory, I suspect that China is concerned with 
the implications of the dramatic territorial changes 
that took place in Europe and the Soviet Union 1989 
and 1990. These changes have in effect “demolished 
part of the basis of the postwar settlement and the 
cold war.”113 Even though these changes themselves 
have not directly impacted East Asia yet, they will 
sooner or later, because the postwar territorial settle-
ment about China, Russia, Japan and Koreas, not to 
mention the South China Sea, is equally “a regional 
expression of war settlement that can be compared 
across the globe.”114 China knows, for the first time 
in 70 years, that we are in a period when any of these 
States may redefine its position in the postwar inter-
national order. That is China’s major concern that 
must have prompted President Xi Jinping to pursue 
“the realization of the Chinese dream of the great 
national renewal”115
 The brutal campaigns of the “Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), the non-state-organiza-
tion, for territorial expansion across state boundaries 
in the middle east indicates the same attempt to rede-
fine the territorial boundaries drawn by the victors 
as a result of the postwar settlement, i.e., the Sykes-
Picot Agreement between France and the United 
Kingdom (the Asia Minor Agreement of 1916).116
VI. International Law as an Essential Tool of 
Mediation
China’s claims for acquisition of islands in the 
South China Sea are based on distorted facts and the 
self-serving interpretation of “archipelagic State,” 
“historic title,” “traditional fishing rights” for archi-
pelagic States, the “straight archipelagic base line,” 
and other relevant provisions of the U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea in such a manner as to suit 
the realization of “the Chinese dream of the great 
national renewal.” Such claims are contrary to “the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which 
President Xi himself considers “open and inclusive 
principles of international law.”117 Such open and 
39
E.Suzuki,   The Post-War International Order with Chinese Characteristics and the “Enemy State”  
Clauses of the United Nations Charter
118 Jaime Laude, “China seen risking naval confrontation with Spratly claimants,” Philippine Star, 26 Oct. 2014; available at <https://ph.news.yahoo.com/
china-seen-risking-naval-confrontation-000000826.html>
119 Dexter Roberts, “Shark Fin Soup Still Sells Despite China’s Extravagance Crackdown,” Business Week, 20 Dec. 2013; available at <http://www.
businessweek.com/articles/2013-12-20/shark-fin-soup-still-sells-despite-chinas-extravagance-crackdown>
120 “Africa ivory smuggled on China state visit,” The Telegraph, 6 Nov. 2014; available at <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
china/11214119/Africa-ivory-smuggled-on-China-state-visit.html>
121 “The red coral poaching problem,” The Japan Times, Editorials, 24 Nov. 2014; available at <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/11/24/
editorials/red-coral-poaching-problem/#.VIkJ194cQcA>
122 McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 37, at 3.
123 See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York,1995 (Second edition), 29-35, 62-65.
124 G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71.
125  W. Michael Reisman, “Aftershocks: Reflections on the Implications of September 11,” 6 Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 81, 101 (2003); 
available at <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol6/iss1/3>.
inclusive principles of international law will not 
support China’s unilaterally declared “core interests” 
at the expense of other people’s interests.118 China’s 
unilateral claims for territorial acquisition in the East 
China Sea and the South China Sea have curious 
correlations with mounting evidence of Chinese 
voracious appetite that is threatening the world’s 
species: shark fin119 and ivory.120 Most of their opera-
tions are undertaken in violation of international law. 
Moreover, recent massive poaching operations by 
over 200 fishing boats of red coral around the Bonin 
Islands, located 1000 kilometers directly south of 
Tokyo, seem to indicate that their activities were 
state-directed.121 Given these extraordinary China-
centric behavior, it is no strange coincidence that 
China’s close allies in the past sixty years have all 
fell out with her and even waged war against her. The 
Soviet Union, Vietnam and Albania left long ago, 
and now Myanmar and North Korea are on the verge 
of their decision to leave the Chinese orbit.
Of course, today’s world is not the same as the 
world Hegel depicted two hundred years ago. Nor did 
international law remain static as described by him. 
Throughout history international law has developed 
to be an instrument to provide a common standard 
against which the conduct of international actors can 
be judged. Such common standard is the outcome of 
the process of inter-determination in an interacting, 
and interdependent world. As Myres S. McDougal 
and Harold D. Lasswell taught us long ago,
[A] legal order of inclusive scope can only come 
into existence in a process of interaction in which 
every particular legal advance both strengthens a 
world public order and is in turn itself supported 
and strengthened by that order. The processes 
of law have as their proper office the synthe-
sizing and stabilizing of creative efforts toward 
a new order by the procedures and structures 
of authority, thereby consolidating gains and 
providing guidance for the next steps along the 
path toward a universal system.122
The post-war international order as reflected 
in the U.N. Charter itself is built, in part, on the 
principle of regionalism.123 Peoples of different 
regions characterized by their respective civiliza-
tions, cultures, religions, mores, etc. are interacting 
to maximize their preferred values. The process of 
inter-determination on a global scale has produced 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 as the 
universal “standard of achievement.”124 International 
law that has historically been used as a tool to 
mediate between different civilizations, religions and 
cultures now incorporates these human rights prin-
ciples as part of the common standard of conduct.125 
Respect for each other’s dignity and freedom of 
choice, commitment to dispute resolution by peaceful 
means, and minimization of coercion must underpin 
President Xi’s statement, “Hegemony or militarism is 
simply not in the genes of the Chinese.” It is neither 
befitting for, nor worthy of, China as the guardian 
and custodian of the rich tradition and profound 
heritage of a great civilization to invoke the “enemy 
state” clauses that are now commonly considered 
obsolete and inapplicable. ♥♥♥
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